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defendant was entitled to a bill of particulars and an examination
before trial on the question of damages where the plaintiff had been
awarded summary judgment on the question of liability and a hearing
had been scheduled for the assessment of damages. The Civil Court,
New York County, held that the motion for summary judgment foreclosed the opportunities for disclosure which the defendant would have
had if the case had proceeded routinely to trial, and that the defendant,
in effect, would still have to face a "trial" for damages. 114 The court
found that the bill of particulars 15 and examination as to damages",,
were "material and necessary" and so ruled in favor of the defendant.
Doxtator v. Swarthout and Appeal PrintingCo. v. Levine clearly
satisfy the Allen test of "usefulness and reason." These decisions are
excellent examples of a liberal and enlightened approach to discovery
procedure.
CPLR 3101 (a): Courts differ on whether a plaintiff is entitled to discovery and inspection of defendants automobile liability insurance
policy.
The Court of Appeals, in Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing
Co., 17 broadened the criteria of "material and necessary" under CPLR
8101 to require "disclosure upon request of any facts bearing on the
controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the
issues and reducing delay and prolixity." 118 Prior to Allen, the Supreme
Court, New York County, in Gold v. Jacobi,"9 held that insurance
policy limits in negligence suits were not "material and necessary" and
refused to allow such discovery. Although alluding to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and their emphasis on "relevancy,"'' 20 the court
stated that the Legislature, in adopting the CPLR, had opted for a more
restrictive approach to pretrial disclosure and that any change should
1141d. at 78, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
115 In Glove City Amusement Co. v. Smalley Chain Theatres, Inc., 167 Misc. 603, 604-

05, 4 N.Y.S.2d 397, 400 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1938), the court observed:
The purpose of a bill of particulars is, generally, to advise the defendant of

plaintiff's claims, to enable the defendant to prepare to meet those claims, and
to assist the court. It is as necessary and useful upon an assessment of damages as
upon a trial.
See also McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605 (1930).
116 See Shemitz v. Junior Center, 74 N.Y.S.2d 34 (N.Y. City Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
"17 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 NX.E2d 430, 288 N.YS.2d 449 (1968), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 43 ST. JoHN'S L. R v. 302, 324 (1968).
118 Id. at 406, 235 N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
119 52 Misc. 2d 491, 276 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
120 F D.R. Civ. PRoc. 26(b). For discussion of the test of "relevancy," see 8 C. WmGr
& A. Mmuma, FEDERAL PPAcrxcE Amn PRocEDuRE: CIVIL § 2010 (1970); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d
822 (1967). For a comparison of different state standards, see Davis, PretrialDiscovery of
Insurance Coverage, 16 WAYNE L. Rlv. 1047 (1970); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 822 (1967).
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be made by that body rather than by the courts.' 2 ' The question of
whether Allen supersedes Gold v. Jacobi on the issue of discoverability
of liability insurance policy limits remains unresolved. Two recent decisions illustrate differing approaches taken by the courts.
In Sashin v. Santelli Construction Co.,122 the plaintiff sought discovery of all insurance policies covering the defendant, for the sole purpose of being able to adjust his settlement strategy accordingly. The
Supreme Court, Ulster County, in offering a restrictive interpretation
of Allen, held that a liberal disclosure policy should apply only to evidentiary, as opposed to nonevidentiary, matters and that insurance
policy limits, which are not admissible as evidence, were beyond the
Allen purview. 123 In finding Gold v. Jacobi still controlling, the court
called for a legislative amendment to the CPLR rather than a judicial
revision.
The Supreme Court, Albany County, in State National Bank v.
2 4 reached an opposite conclusion in permitting discovery
Gregorio,and inspection of the defendant's liability insurance policy. Finding no
prejudice to the defendant when such discovery is confined to the pretrial stage and not mentioned to the jury, the court noted that a liberal
disclosure policy on this issue would facilitate early settlement and pretrial disposition of automobile collision claims, which are currently
congesting court calendars. 125 In rejecting Gold v. Jacobi, the court
argued that under Seider v. Roth,2 discovery of insurance policies has
been allowed on an in rem basis, and that the liberal Allen guidelines
should be construed as permitting discovery when in personam juris7
diction has been obtained.2
The more liberal view adopted in State National Bank v. Gregorio
28
seems more consistent with the Allen test of "usefulness and reason,"'
and should promote efficient settlement of negligence actions without
prejudice to either party2 9 The legal fiction that the insured is the real
121

PRAcmnc

For an analysis of the "material and necessary" test, see H. WAcnrEIL, Nmv YoRK
UNDm TH CPLR 231 (Ist ed. 1963); 3 WK&M %3101.07. For an analysis of how

Allen apparently brings CPLR 3101 into conformity with the federal standard, see 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR s101, commentary at 11 (1970).
'2269 Misc. 2d 695, 830 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1972).
123 Id. at 696, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
'2468 Misc. 2d 926, 328 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1971).
125 Id. at 927, 328 N.YS.2d at 801.
126 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 NXE.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
127 68 Misc. 2d at 928, 328 N.Y.S2d at 801.
128 Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 235 NX.2d 430, 432,
288 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (1968).
'29 Counsel for both plaintiff and defendant have acquired by experience a pretty
good idea of a case's value. Irrespective of coverage, a case should be settled for
what it is worth. If the parties cannot get together, the jury, without knowledge
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party in interest, although useful at trial, is inappropriate at the pretrial
level, particularly when, as with automobile coverage, the requirements
of compulsory insurance are generally known. The CPLR should be
amended to expressly authorize discovery of insurance policies.
ARTICLE 32-

AccELTRAmD JUDGMENT

CollateralEstoppel: A misapplication.
Donato v. Cataffo'80 was an automobile accident case involving the
owner and the driver of one car and the owner and the driver of another car. Both defendants moved for summary judgment, and the plaintiff-owner cross-moved for summary judgment. Prior to this action, a
passenger in the plaintiff-owner's vehicle had obtained judgment against
all the parties hereto. The absentee plaintiff-owner had not acquiesced
in the use of his vehicle for any business reason. The plaintiff-owner
contended that the decisive case was Mills v. Gabriel,131 which held
that a driver's negligence is not imputable to an absentee owner when
he attempts to recover his own damages. The defendants argued that
the plaintiff-owner was collaterally estopped under the previous action.1 32 They relied on Schwartz v. Public Administrator of Bronx
County,133 which established two prerequisites to invocation of
collateral estoppel: (1) an identity of issue necessarily decided previously, and (2) a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior decision. 1' 4
The Donato court chose to apply the collateral estoppel theory. 3 5
In so doing, the court erred. The Schwartz case, which involved a suit
between two operators, was not in point, for Donato was an action by
an owner whose liability was wholly different from that of the driver
of policy limits, will resolve the issue for them. If a case is evaluated below the
policy limits, no problem arises. If it is serious enough to call for an evaluation
above the limits, in practice it would generally be settled within such limits, if'the
plaintiff knows what they are. Only in rare instances will a plaintiff persist in a
demand above policy limits, even if his injuries call for a possible recovery in
excess thereof. What's the use of incurring the expenses of a trial, and losing
valuable time, if a judgment in excess of the limits is uncollectible?
Jenkins, Discovery of Automobile Liability Insurance Limits: Quillets of the Law, 14 KAN.
L. REv. 59, 78-79 (1965).
130 69 Misc. 2d 705, 330 N.YS.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972).
131 259 App. Div. 60, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 755, 81 N.E,2d 512

(1940).

132 For a thorough discussion of collateral estoppel, see Rosenberg, CollateralEstoppel

in New York, 44 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 165 (1969).
133 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E2.d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 44 ST. JoHn's L. REV. 136, 153 (1969).

184 Id. at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 959. As to which parties are bound
5011.32-.37.
by prior judgments and affected by collateral estoppel, see 5 WK&M
See also H. WAcnEaLL, NEW YoRK ParAca UNDaE rM CPLR 350-52 (3d ed. 1970).
135 69 Misc. 2d at 707-08, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 589-40.

